HAS HUME REFUTED THE DESIGN ARGUMENT?

In my opinion, David Hume, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, completely destroys the traditional design argument. In this essay I will outline an example of the traditional design argument, as written by Newton, and also Hume’s critique of this argument, in his ‘Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion’ (1779, 1990, Bell ed.) This discussion is summarised in the Robert Hurlbutt book  ‘Hume, Newton and the Design Argument’ (Lincoln University Press, 1965).

Newton seems to base his theology upon the limitations of his science, which may be a bad thing, because over time science becomes updated and his theories become obsolete. However, Newton at this point introduces his design argument in a more explicit sense than before:

“To make this system, therefore, with all its motions, required a cause which understood, and compared together, the quantities of matter in the several bodies of the sun and planets, and the gravitating powers resulting from thence…and to compare and adjust all these things together in so great and variety of bodies, argues that cause to be not blind and fortuitous, but very well skilled in mechanicks and geometry.” (Opera Omnia, pp 431-432).

Newton uses his scientific findings in two ways, firstly to show that his science is not adequate to fully explain the order of the world, and secondly to show that the very things he has discovered such as motions and velocities are evidence for the existence of a creator. I will now look at the main contentions of this argument.

The first point of contention is that the scientific mechanics of the world do not give a full explanation of everything within the world. This seems like a plausible premise to me, because it seems even today that not everything in the world can be fully explained by science or through technology, and this would be an even stronger case in the 17^th and 18^th centuries. The argument is also a posteriori, for it starts from a scientific basis or observable phenomena within nature. The main thrust of the argument is the analogical element of the proof. This says that the order of the world is similar to the order imposed by humans within machines, and so therefore the order of the world implies an intelligent creator in the same way that machines imply an intelligent creator, namely humans. Furthermore, the argument like most design arguments is teleological, in that it relies on “purposive relationships as evidence” (Hurlbutt, p8). In this case, the telic aspect is not in nature itself, but rather in the mind of the creator. The order, however, is in nature, and even without purpose would constitute order. This design argument is known as the argument from design. I will now move on to Newton’s discussion of the design argument in the Optics (1718).

In the Optics, Newton repeats his argument from design, but also begins to talk about an argument to design. This is developed again through the starting point of the first cause being teleological and beyond the explanation of mechanical science. After he talks about the argument from design, he looks at the contrivance or seeming order within the bodies of animals. Not only are the animals in the world ordered, but also they seem to have purposive behaviour. So not only is Newton looking at the mechanical order within the world, but also the telic aspect of the relationships between parts of organisms. The point of this approach to the argument is to show that the degree of order and purpose within bodies suggests the need for a contriver or designer, because the animals could not have been responsible for the contrivances in themselves.

This then, is the argument to design, where the term ‘design’ is talking about the intention of something or other.

Newton then appears to push his theory further by the mention of what he believes matter to be, namely inert and passive. From this Newton is trying to show how not only does God keep things in order, but he started off the entire process of creation by putting matter into motion. Newton also uses both order and disorder to put his point across that all things came from inert, solid particles and were arranged by God, and are continually arranged. He says that if things are in order, then there is evidence for a creator. However, if things are in disorder, then there needs to be a creator to put them in order. This argument is one that Hume turns upon Newton in order to show the design argument to be incorrect, which I will discuss later on in the essay.

Now I will look at what Newton says about theology in the added General Scholium in book three of the Principia.

In the Scholium, Newton again talks about the design argument, but without this time appealing to purposive order. He simply talks about the analogy of the order of the world and how from it you can infer the need for an intelligent creator. Newton’s downfall in this section, however, is to start talking about God in the traditional theistic sense, such as that God is all powerful, and omniscient and benevolent, which do not appear to be logically connected with the design proof he has given, although it seems clear that they could be linked in some way with the design argument, as we will see later in the attacks by Hume on such topics as benevolence and intelligence.

In his Dialogues, Hume is attacking natural theology, in particular the design argument in the form linked to a posteriori methods of science. Hume clinically destroys this form of argument in a subtle way, but it is clear his views are at least agnostic in the sense that he does not see any rational reason why we should believe in the sort of God that Christian Theology usually describes. Hume is attacking both ancient and modern forms of the design argument, which share the same analogical form of inference about the order of the world and the necessity for a creator. This forms Hume’s main point of attack.

The Dialogues take the form of a discussion between three people; Philo, who appears to be the voice of Hume, Demea, who is the voice of the a priori school of theology, and Cleanthes, who is the voice of theologians who believe in the design argument, such as Newton. I will mainly be talking about Philo (Hume) and Cleanthes because Demea is less important in the discussion of the design argument.

In the Dialogues, Hume uses three arguments to criticise the design argument:

1.    The weak analogy argument.

2.    The uniqueness argument

3.    The designer without God argument.

The discussion begins with the setting up of a traditional design argument (Hume, Dialogues, pps 302-303), which Cleanthes lays out as follows:

(A1) Houses are the product of intelligent design.

(A2) It is likely (i.e., probable) that the Universe is the product of intelligent design.

We observe houses, paintings, and machines produced by humans. We see that these things have the common features of order and being produced by intelligent design. It is natural to conclude that orderly things are produced by intelligence. Since the Universe is orderly, it must have also been created by an

intelligence.

This argument is very similar in form to design arguments that Newton proposes, and which Hume now attacks through the voice of Philo.

Philo takes Cleanthes’ argument as an argument from analogy, and he thinks that all such arguments involve the following form:

(P1) Object A has some property P.

(P2) Object A and object B are similar overall to some degree N.

(A3) Therefore, Object B has property P.

Philo believes that such arguments are as reliable or likely as the evidence for N in (P2) is reliable. For example, if Mary breathes air, it seems highly likely that John breathes air, because they are similar overall to a high degree. But, if you said because Mary breathes air, then a spider must breathe air, then the conclusion is much less likely because they are not similar overall. It is from this idea that Philo creates a counter-example to Cleanthes formation of the design argument. It goes as follows:

(P3) Houses have the property of being produced by intelligent design.

(P4) Houses and the Universe are NOT similar overall.

(A4*) Therefore, it is unlikely that the Universe has the property of being produced by intelligent design.

Philo is saying that the strength of Cleanthes’ argument is based upon the assumption that houses are similar overall to the Universe, which clearly does not seem to be the case. Philo therefore denies this idea, which seems to show up Cleanthes’ argument as a poor analogy.

This argument could be used to deny something such as Paley’s watchmaker example. By denying that watches are in any way similar overall to living organisms, this argument also appears to use a poor analogy.

However, Paley and Cleanthes need not be committed to an overall similarity between watches and living organisms or houses and the Universe. They merely need to say that they share a common property, namely order. And that if the best explanation of the order within houses is an intelligent designer, then this can used to conclude that the best explanation for order in the Universe is an intelligent designer.

Better still, it could be concluded that Cleanthes’ argument does not even require an analogy for it to work. He could be construed as arguing not by analogy, but by an inference of the best explanation. He could argue from the inference of the observation of order within the Universe to the best explanation of that order, namely an intelligent designer. Cleanthes here uses a principle that is often referred to as the surprise principle. The principle is that from an observation, one hypothesis can be supported above another if from the observation we would expect one of the hypotheses to be true, and one to not be true. For example, we would expect a watch to exist if we postulated a watchmaker, but we would not expect to find a watch just from the random crashing of waves against a shore. Furthermore, it seems that mere chance would not lead us to expect complex living organisms, but an intelligent creator would. This would of course depend upon what sort of world a God would create. But if God is benevolent, he would create good states of affairs, and order certainly looks like being a good state of affairs rather than a bad one.

Philo’s second objection to the design argument is known as the uniqueness argument. It is as follows:

 (P5) If the order exemplified in some object Observation1 (O1) is evidence of intelligent design, then we must have had past experiences of other some other like object "O2" and past experiences of "O2 being produced by intelligent design."

(P6) We have had neither past experiences of other Universes nor experiences of any Universe being produced by intelligent design.

(A5) Therefore, the order exemplified in the Universe is not evidence of intelligent design.

Things like houses and paintings are evidence for an intelligent designer because we have seen them in the past associated with builders and artists. But, we have not even had previous experiences of other Universes, let alone Universes being created by intelligent designers, so we cannot make an inference as we would do with houses and paintings.

However, there seem to be some problems with this objection as well. Firstly, the argument seems to rest on a premise that just seems false. That premise (P5) claims that we can only legitimately explain observable phenomena by appealing to things that are themselves observable, or at least observable in principle. But this sort of idea would make almost all of modern science unwarranted. Theories such as those about atoms, quarks, black holes, and many more require the postulation of unobservable phenomena. It seems extreme to just throw all these theories away, especially as many of these theories seem fundamentally correct.

I will now look at Hume’s third argument that he puts forward using the voice of Philo. This argument is the argument about a designer other than God. Philo says that at most, the design argument shows the need for a designer, but not that the designer must be an all-powerful, all-knowing God, as Newton would suggest.

Philo says:

By this method of reasoning you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under cognizance, is not infinite, what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the divine being. . . (Hume, Dialogues, Part III).

Philo also raises difficulties about the other attributes of the traditional description of God. He says that if God was perfect, then why are there so many imperfections within the Universe? Furthermore, why should it be assumed that there is a single designer? For within the creation of buildings, there are multiple creators. This objection does seem problematic if Cleanthes’ argument does use an analogy. Cleanthes can argue for a designer, but due to the high degree of similarity between houses and the Universe that he is using in his argument, the above objection would rule out the designer being God.

It seems quite right that nothing that Cleanthes has said requires that the designer needs to be God. But if you look at the argument in the form of an inference as previously discussed, the question becomes whether the non-God designer hypothesis is better supported by the observations than the God designer hypothesis. . For instance, the non-God designer hypothesis might lead us to expect an imperfect Universe, whereas the God hypothesis might lead us to expect a perfect Universe. The imperfections in the Universe might then be seen as evidence of a non-God designer. However, the non-God designer hypothesis might lead to other problems such as how to explain such a designer’s existence and nature.

It seems to me that the design argument in the form proposed by Newton, and set out in the Dialogues by Cleanthes, looks vulnerable to Hume’s objections. However, their effectiveness seems largely reduced when Cleanthes’ argument is seen as an inference argument rather than one that uses an analogy. However, if the argument is seen as one that uses an analogy, Hume, through the voice of Philo, can raise the following dilemma:

  1.    Either houses are very similar to the Universe or the Universe is not very similar to houses.

2. If houses are very similar to the Universe, then they have a designer who need not be God. (Philo's Non-God Designer Argument)

3. If the Universe is not very similar to houses, then it does not need a designer. (Philo's Weak Analogy Argument)

4. Therefore, either the Universe does not need a designer or it needs a designer who need not be God.

This argument mimics the analogy of order and disorder that Newton uses to argue that there must be a God. It turns it around to suggest that there is not a God. I think this is a particularly effective argument against the design argument that uses analogy.

However, the worries about the argument in the form of inference to the best explanation must be looked at. The question here is whether God is a better explanation for the order in the world than mere chance or a non-God designer. One argument that Paley, for example, would give is that the God hypothesis is more likely than chance as an explanation for living organisms. The problem here is that the inference to the explanation is very dependent on the alternate hypotheses that can be offered. So instead of taking chance as the alternative of God, you could take Darwinian evolution. It seems something like Darwinian theory would have an explanatory advantage over the God hypothesis, because it we would expect from evolution the many imperfections that we do indeed have in the world.

It seems that Hume’s argument do in fact cause serious problems for proponents of the design argument. If the argument uses analogies, then Hume’s arguments are devastating. If the argument uses the inference to the best explanation, it does not have enough evidence to show that it is the best explanation for order in the world, and indeed the entire universe.

Bibliography

Hume, David. (1779). Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. by Martin Bell. Penguin: 1990.

Hurlbutt, Robert. (1965). Hume, Newton and Design Argument. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Newton, Isaac, Opera Quae Exstant Omnia, ed. Horsely. London. 1782, IV.

Newton, Isaac. Opticks, reprint with analytical table of contents by Duane H.D. Roller. New York. (1952). 

Paley, William. (1802). Natural Theology: or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected from the appearances of Nature. New ed. London: W Mason, (1817).

© David Friesen 2004